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5 Absentee workers
Representation and participation in the
cultural industries
Kate Oakley
Introduction
As the problems of cultural labour markets become more apparent, an
appropriate political response seems elusive. Should public policy, as it does
in the UK, continue to concentrate on issues of access to the labour market
(via apprenticeships, regulated internships and so on), without concerning
itself about working conditions within the cultural industries? Can workers’
organizations, either those based on precarity1 or established trade unions,
reverse the tide of disorganized capitalism in these sectors? Who represents
cultural industry workers in these debates?
As Banks and Hesmondhalgh (2009) comment, public policy has tended to
ignore or gloss over the problems of cultural labour markets, in part at least
because of the assumption that such work is inherently good (desirable,
enjoyable and so on). For many of those supporting the development of the
cultural industries, whether as part of regional or urban economic develop-
ment schemes, or in practice-based settings – teaching in community arts,
drama, music and so on – the idea of cultural work as ‘good work’ is held
dear (Rimmer 2009).
The concern of those involved in such initiatives has often been with
securing representation within these labour markets for women, ethnic mino-
rities and working-class people. This may have been informed in part by an
idealized notion of this work, but it was primarily driven by other factors. For
those concerned with economic development in regions facing mass unem-
ployment, cultural work was ‘rooted’ work, tied to, and in some ways
expressive of place, and capable of producing long-term employment in an
age when, as Andrew Ross puts it, industrial restructuring has not been ‘kind
to the cause of secure or sustainable livelihoods’ (Ross 2009: 20).
However, it was also animated, in a way peculiar to cultural work, by the
importance of voice, the idea that involvement in cultural production cannot
be conﬁned to the elite, if there is to be any hope of a more democratic cul-
ture or indeed society. Who gets to make culture, in its widest sense from
advertisements to TV news bulletins and situation comedies, matters, because
it is how we understand ourselves as a society. The origins of cultural
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industries policy in the UK lies in the ‘municipal socialism’ of cities like
Sheﬃeld, Manchester and London, where the aim was, as Peck puts it, ‘to
pluralize the sphere of cultural distribution and consumption, to broaden
access to cultural markets and to cultural work, and to recognize the creativ-
ity of marginalised social groups’ (Peck 2011: 47).
Yet in the decades since the ﬁrst cultural industry initiatives the margin-
alization of women, ethnic minorities and the working class from participa-
tion in cultural labour markets has grown, not declined (Skillset 2009). The
politics of cultural industries policy making has shifted from municipal soci-
alism to neoliberal urbanism (Peck 2011), albeit it in a variety of forms
(Larner and Craig 2005). Changes in the wider organization of capitalism,
post-Fordism in particular, which for some appeared to hold out the promise
of better working conditions, are part of this story. Alongside that, the virtual
exclusion of the politics of labour from the policy-making process allowed the
development of a discourse of ‘representation’ in the workforce that paid no
attention to questions of working conditions. The result of that is the devel-
opment of a highly unrepresentative cultural sector, with often poor working
conditions.
The chapter draws on the experience of the UK, particularly in the last 30
years or so, but it is part of a much wider international debate. The popular-
ity of cultural industries as an economic development strategy is now global
(Cunningham 2007), as are the growing movements of young people, both
precariously emplo ed and unemployed, and of students, who wish to work in
these industries.
The trouble with work
The development of cultural industries policy in the UK, and thus the reali-
zations of these ideas about the nature of work, took place under a govern-
ment – the modiﬁer ‘New’ notwithstanding – that derived its existence from
the labour movement (Oakley 2011). Parties of the ‘centre left’, from Brazil’s
Partido dos Trabalhadores, to the German SPD (Social Democratic Party)
have been, if anything, keener on promoting the development of cultural
industries than their counterparts on the right.
I have argued elsewhere (Oakley 2011) that in the case of the British
Labour Party, this reﬂects the centrality of work to much of the New Labour
project.2 In part this was a response to what was regarded as a shameful tol-
erance of long-term unemployment and its social consequences by the pre-
vious Conservative government, but beyond this, a reformed labour market
was believed by New Labour to oﬀer political success in a variety of areas. At
the ‘top’ of the labour market skills were seen as the key to improving Brit-
ain’s economic competiveness, while the answer to the problems of poverty
and social exclusion at the ‘bottom’ was believed to be via integration into the
labour market. Throughout society, higher skills were seen to be linked to
adaptability and resilience, helping to produce the neoliberal subject, who
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could not only cope with, but also thrive on, the sort of changes that the
economy was understood to be delivering (Seltzer and Bentley 1999; Gibson
and Klocker 2005).
Despite this emphasis, however, questions about quality of work, work
organization and control of working lives rarely troubled New Labour. A
minimum wage was introduced for the ﬁrst time in the UK; there were some
changes to the previous government’s anti-union legislation3 and statutory
paid paternity leave was launched, alongside slightly improved maternity
leave. However, issues of workers’ control and ownership and the democrati-
zation of economic decision making, which had been a prominent feature of
Labour Party discussions in the 1970s and 1980s (Thompson 2002), were
regarded as anachronistic, if they were acknowledged at all. Indeed the cur-
rent revival in the UK of interest in cooperatives and other forms of mutual
ownership, owes as much to sections of the paternalistic or ‘red’ Tories (the
UK Conservatives), as it does to Labour or the trade unions (Norman 2008;
Blond 2009, 2010).
A long-term debate on the left would see this resulting from a widespread,
if not universal, decoupling of political parties of the left from the labour
movement. From a Marxist point of view, this represents a fundamental loss
of faith in the working class as the primary agent of the progress towards
socialism, and the replacement of its crucial role with the politics of identity
and social movements (Wood 1986). For others it was a necessary adaptation
to the alleged ‘withering away’ of the working class, at least in the global
North (Hobsbawm 1981).
For the New Left, the need to develop a political movement beyond white,
male trade uni nists was not only necessitated, ut also facilitated, by chan-
ges in the structure of capitalism. As a consequence of this, work lost its
centrality in the politics of the left, a change that would have implications for
all workers, and indeed for those who deﬁned their politics in other ways,
such as in terms of anti-globalization or as social justice. Not the least of
these was the collapse in the spending power of working people and con-
comitant rise in personal debt, which underlie so much of the continuing
ﬁnancial crisis.
Alongside this, I would argue, is a change in the idea of what good work
and particularly good creative work means. As a ‘patron saint’ of the British
Labour Party (MacCarthy 1994), William Morris is often credited with
informing its ideas about ‘good work’ (Morris 1884). While distrust of ‘proﬁt
mongering’, as Morris called it, never ran that deeply in the Labour Party, his
notion of the working life as a source of education, and of the inseparability
of mental and manual work, both described and predicted the experience of
the labour movement as a counterculture, which concerned itself not only
with daily working conditions, but with the education, recreation and self-
expression of an entire class (Wills and Simms 2004; Mason 2007). One can
sees echoes of such views through a variety of forms of workers’ education,
the community arts movement of the post-war period, and in what is
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sometimes called the non-formal learning sector (NFLS) today (Samuel 2006;
Sefton-Green 2008; Rimmer 2009).
While daily working conditions under Fordism were anathema to all that
Morris would have promoted, it was its collapse that brought an end to a
labour movement that could ensure, albeit partially and highly unequally,
levels of security and links to training and education that could in part com-
pensate for an often brutal daily reality. The criticism of this ‘gas and water’
socialism was that the notions of mutuality and self-suﬃciency that had ani-
mated Victorian reformers had been sacriﬁced for eﬃcient economic growth
and a social wage (Bevir 2011). However, while the collapse of Fordism pro-
duced a new and optimistic narrative about work in some parts of the left,
one where the ﬂexible, skilled worker could be made to look like Morris’s
well-rounded and independent artisan (Kelly 1982), the loss of collective
power that ensued drove rapidly widening inequality and helped to produce
today’s fragmented insecurity. It also produced an account of labour markets
from which class issues could be safely excised.
A new dawn? The post-Fordist labour market
Noel Thompson has characterized the enthusiasm in some sections of the left
for what was believed, from the 1970s onwards, to be the changing nature of
work as ‘post-Fordist socialism’ (Thompson 2002). ‘Flexible specialization’,
that is, ﬁrm strategies based on multi-use equipme t, highly skilled workers
and strategies of competition through innovation, appeared to some thinkers
on the left as a re-valorization of work and workers, not a diminishing of
them. Such attitudes were highly inﬂuential on the British Labour Party as it
reconstructed itself during the 1980s and 1990s, and indeed fed into many
‘cultural industry’ debates of that period and later.
Robin Murray (1988) argued that post-Fordism saw labour as the key asset
of modern production, while others argued that it produced ‘ﬂatter’, less
hierarchical workplaces, allowing both productivity gains and the develop-
ment of a more contented workforce (Sabel 1982; Handy 1995). We can see
this sort of language directly echoed in later writers on the ‘creative econ-
omy’, such as Florida (2002).
Such expertise, ‘knowledge of industrial processes, markets, even the char-
acter of key personnel’, is what Paul Hirst called ‘intimate knowledge’ (Hirst
1989: 276). It was deemed vital to the triumph of the post-Fordist enterprise,
relying, as it often did, on tacit, embedded forms of know-how, particularly
suited to small ﬁrms in speciﬁc locales. Economic success was seen to depend
not on ‘cut throat competition among atomistic entrepreneurs’, but on a
complex set of sub-contracting relationships that both required and engen-
dered high levels of trust and cooperation (Zeitlin 1989: 369).
Some went so far as to claim that the post-Fordist production paradigm
means that democratization of industry became essential, and that workers
who ‘experience a sense of empowerment and responsibility at work that was
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denied them under conditions of mass production’ could be expected to take a
greater interest in community and wider political aﬀairs (Mathews 1989: xiv).
In this way, the goals of economic (and wider) democracy could be allied to
economic revitalization, both of the ﬁrm and, ideally, the region or nation in
which it was situated.
For a time at least, this notion of post-Fordism was allied to a debate about
ownership and participation at work. Opening up company boards to worker
involvement, amending company law to broaden the accountability of boards
of directors and mandate wider social goals, enshrining rights to training and
education, the promotion of worker co-operatives: these and other matters
were advocated by some post-Fordists (Hirst 1989; Mathews 1989; Kelly
1982). All this tapped into a long history on the left, but it was a history that
was often recast as being free from the failures associated with statism and
Keynesian economic policies. The decentralization of economic activity away
from the head oﬃces of large corporations was seen as being paralleled by a
decentralization of economic policy making away from national governments
to regions, and the diﬀusion of industrial relations negotiations from the
national oﬃces of the ‘big’ trade unions, directly to the skilled workforces in
the local ﬁrm.
However, this discourse often appeared to have little to say about the larger
international context in which such developments were taking place. The
growth in international capital movements during the 1980s and 1990s, and
the resulting increased volatility of the global economic system, together with
the growing power of transnational organizations, was largely ignored by
some post-Fordists on the left, preoccupied as they were with the local and
the regional, the idea that the future belonged to the small, the ﬂexible and
the deeply embedded. Peck (2011: 49) argues that in the case of the Greater
London Council (GLC) at least,4 the cultural industries project was simply
terminated too early, ‘leaving unresolved a series of searching questions con-
cerning its political-economic sustainability’.
The degree to which its interventions into elements of cultural production
and distribution could ever have been ‘scaled-up’ to a national level remains
unanswerable, but as cultural industry schemes drifted into ‘creative industry’
policies for urban regeneration, concerns about issues such as media owner-
ship, access to distribution chains or intellectual property were dealt with in a
way entirely consistent with neoliberal, deregulatory approaches, with little
attempt to intervene on behalf of national or local ﬁrms (Garnham 2005;
Hesmondhalgh 2005).
The role of the national state or local government in this vision was essen-
tially a permissive one, helping to equip local ﬁrms and local workers to
compete in what was seen as the real agent of change – the market. As
Thompson has commented, responding to customer demand in this way was
seen as the surest way to ensure high-quality products that demanded skill
and imagination in their production (Thompson 2002). The Morrisonian
craftsman may have come back into fashion, but his idea that good creative
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work can only be realized in producing useful things, not in adding to over-
consumption, ﬁtted less well with the spirit of the times.
Not at the table – organized labour and the cultural industries
In this zeitgeist, trade unions, for so long the active agent of change in the
labour movement, were relegated to a subsidiary role. Levels of unionism
were relatively low in many of the craft-based ﬁrms so beloved of post-For-
dists, and small, geographically scattered workplaces made unionization diﬃ-
cult. The distinctions between more highly skilled craft labour and other,
more casualized, sub-contracted labour, were often strong, even in the para-
gon regions of post-Fordism such as Emilia Romagna (Thompson 2002).
Some post-Fordist writers sought to draw distinctions between ‘continental’
European unions, who they argued were in favour of ‘job enrichment’ pro-
cesses, and those in the UK who preferred the ‘comforting incantation’ that
capital puts proﬁts before people, and were not persuaded by talk of the more
humane workplace (Kelly 1982: 15). In such cases it was suggested, unions
had ‘a fatalistic attitude to the prospect of progressively reforming work’
(Kelly 1982: 16), preferring to concentrate on maintaining wage levels or the
re-grading of particular types of work.
In the cultural industries, the debate was somewhat diﬀerently framed.
When alighting on these sectors as part of the ‘new economy’, the discussion
of boring, repetitive or demeaning work was largely absent. This was depicted
as useful work, not useless toil. However, here too the decline of unionization
is a major part of the story of work. The cultural industries, particularly when
grouped under the looser heading of ‘creative ind stries’ have always had
diﬀering levels of unionization, with the media sectors such as journalism and
broadcasting traditionally heavily unionized, alongside some performing arts
such as acting. Other activities, from crafts and visual arts on one hand, to
advertising and architecture on the other, have been much less so. The largely
self-employed character of individual makers in the arts is one reason; those
in creative services such as advertising, design and so on more resemble
‘knowledge-based’ workers such as IT professionals in having relatively low
levels of unionization.
The story of declining union representation in the cultural industries as
they reconstructed themselves along post-Fordist lines is well told (Christo-
pherson and Storper 1989; Ursell 1998, 2000). Such changes made it easier
not only to celebrate the cultural industries as archetypal new economy sec-
tors (Cunningham 2002), but also to conduct policy conversations in which
the issues of labour – working conditions and hours, access to training, own-
ership and control – were easily ignored.
In its New Labour incarnation, engagement with trade unions was a mini-
mal part of cultural-industry policy making. As Hesmondhalgh and Pratt
(2005) pointed out, one of the problems of cultural industry policy making
from the beginning was ‘the intertwined story that we are told of the
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development of the cultural industries as big businesses and the development
of local and national cultural industries policy’.
In other words, policy was supposed to deal with both multinational orga-
nizations and single artists. In practice, given that most of the work was car-
ried out at the regional and local level, the cultural businesses in question
were generally small businesses or loose networks of individuals. When real
money was at stake, such as in discussions of intellectual property or broad-
casting, larger rights-holders were of course party to discussions, but the
‘average’ cultural industry intervention was characterized by an emphasis on
small ﬁrms and individuals, even if the individuals were recast as entrepre-
neurs, and the small ﬁrms as ‘high growth’. When issues of exclusion were
discussed, as they were, given the presence in cultural industry policies of
ideas of social exclusion and regeneration (Oakley 2006), the representatives
of such concerns were more likely to be community arts organizations or
publicly funded networks,5 rather than representatives of labour.
The ‘social conscience’ of the cultural industries
As Banks and others have argued (O’Connor 1998; Banks 2007; Prince 2009),
local cultural industry initiatives generated a set of cultural intermediaries
whose concerns often embraced wider ethical and political issues. Indeed, as
the policy concept of creative industries began to circulate, more individuals
become creative industries ‘experts’, and more clients, needing creative
industry advice, were, for a while at least, created.
However, not all of these individuals or organizations were new to the
game. Many had previously styled themselves as ‘arts consultants’ working on
instrumental cultural policies linking the arts to health, education or other
social amelioration projects. Some had worked within local government: the
Greater London Council’s cultural industries experiment was a notable source
of such people. Others, those in small organizations rather than individuals,
had often started life as community arts organizations. For them, the goal of
helping people to work in the cultural industries was less important as a way
of securing a decent livelihood, or even of regenerating declining local
economies (important as that was), than it was to secure representation from
marginalized groups in industries that were seen as so important to our
shared understanding of ourselves.
As Rimmer (2009) argues, this particular group, many of which started life
in the 1970s or before, had by this period taken a variety of organizational
forms, and indeed their rationales had evolved in response to policy and
funding changes. In the process, they had moved away from a focus on art
making as an element of democratic cultural participation, and towards one
on vocational learning. Ensuring labour market entry for those from under-
represented groups became a key goal, and what had previously been seen as
supporting democratic cultural participation was recast as helping young
people to ﬁnd work in the cultural industries.
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It was in this guise that such organizations were often agents and indeed
recipients of public funding in creative industry initiatives such as the Mayor’s
Commission on the Creative Industries in London, which was set up in
London in 2002 (Oakley 2012). While featuring a couple of representatives of
big business, the Commission also featured representatives of community
development organizations. Alongside the usual concerns of investment,
ensuring access to aﬀordable space, and helping small ﬁrms get intellectual
property (IP) advice, there was strong emphasis within the Commission’s dis-
cussions on issues of diversity (generally understood in terms of ethnicity, but
also gender), and on ensuring that training and skills development was as
widespread as possible to help develop a more representative labour market
(LDA 2003).
It follows from this that work itself – the experience and nature of it –
could not be the problem; the ‘problem’ was getting people into work and this
involved what was often described as ‘working with the grain of the sector’.
Mentoring schemes, work placements and internships that would enable
young people to secure the mix of freelance and unpaid work deemed vital to
entering these sectors thus became part of the vocabulary and practice of
community arts and similar organizations. When the egalitarian culture that
was the heritage of such organizations came into conﬂict with the realities of
a socially stratiﬁed labour market, the result was often a strong resistance to
acknowledge such problems, perhaps fearing that such conversations would
lead people to conclude that cultural work w s best left those who could
handle it, which in practice meant those with relatively high levels of cultural
and economic capital.
What was at stake here was in some cases a confusion between the pro-
motion of cultural industry growth on one hand, and improving the employ-
ment prospects of marginalized young people on the other. Though rhetoric
about cultural industries has often run these two things together, there is in
fact no essential relationship between them. One could easily have ‘successful’
cultural industries growth predicated on a narrow social basis, and indeed
that is what we appear to have.
The promotion of cultural industry growth and the potential of the cultural
industries to oﬀer sustainable employment to relatively large numbers of
people, at all levels of the labour market, was what motivated local autho-
rities and regional development bodies to get involved in support schemes.
However, for many of the cultural intermediaries with which, and through
which, they worked, this was less important than securing representation
within these sectors for voices that they felt would otherwise be silent. The
policy mechanisms in which they involved themselves were essentially mer-
itocratic and involved working within the cultural industry’s often exploitative
employment practices. Through a combination of industry nous and connec-
tions, mentoring schemes and work-based learning, such organizations sought
to diversify the composition of the labour market in ways that ensured that it
had very little to say about its ‘dark side’ (Neilson and Rossiter 2005).
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The issue of social class exclusion was one privately acknowledged by many
community arts workers and cultural industry advocates, but public discourse
tended to focus on visible diﬀerence such as ethnicity, gender or disability – in
part aided by the measurement of such categories in national statistics and
thus the implicit permission to consider this as an issue. The result was that
while many cultural industry interventions explicitly concerned themselves
with questions of social inclusion, the labour market itself was not seen as a
battleground. The politics of organized labour were as distant from cultural
industry policy making as they were from our TV screens and our classrooms.
Absentee workers
Where participation ties into issues of representation and voice, the question
of participation, who gets to be a worker in these industries, is of course vital
to understanding the sort of symbolic texts our cultural industries produce
and thus a major part of our self-understanding as a society. However, while
there is research that looks at the representation and portrayal of class in the
media and other cultural arenas (Grindstaﬀ 2002; Skeggs 2004; Wood and
Skeggs 2008), there are relatively few such studies that link this to issues of
labour and participation in labour markets.
One great exception, Michael Denning’s account of the US ‘cultural front’
in the 1930s and 1940s (Denning 1997), attempts to link working-class parti-
cipation, unionization and cultural expression. He argues that the inﬂuence of
labour unions and leftist politics not only ensured better representation of
working-class people and better working conditions, but also shaped the
popular cultural output f the time: ‘for the ﬁrst time in the history of the
United States, a working class culture had made a signiﬁcant imprint on the
dominant cultural institutions’ (Denning 1997: xx).
Sadly, no such account of the links between the politics of workplace
organization and what Denning calls ‘aesthetic ideology’ (Denning 1997)
exists in a British context. It is tempting to argue, though diﬃcult to evidence,
that what has been called the ‘demonisation’ of the working class in the
British media and in popular culture in recent years (Jones 2011) can be
traced to a declining level of working-class representation in these industries.
Certainly it is the case that participation in many media ﬁelds is more and
more socially skewed (Sutton Trust 2006). As Robertson (2010) argues, the
socially unrepresentative proﬁle of top journalists is accompanied by the fact
that workers and their representatives in the unions are rarely featured as
commentators on economic aﬀairs in any major news bulletin. The degree to
which a tax change, a piece of legislation or the takeover of one ﬁrm by
another is ‘good for business’ is often the only issue considered, while union
commentators are required only when justifying an industrial dispute.
Clearly there is no simple link between representation and portrayal, any
more than there is to consumption. Newspapers like The Sun, which feature
frequent attacks on ‘chavs’ or ‘the underclass’, have a large working-class
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readership, while some defence against the tide of anger at the so-called ‘feral
underclass’ that followed the English riots of 2011 came from the bastions of
high Toryism in The Daily Telegraph (Oborne 2011). However, it does reﬂect
a wider culture, not only of anti-unionism but one where members of the
working class are generally absent, when they are not being denigrated.
The removal of the working class from their central position in the politics
of the left, whether one sees it as a political betrayal, a pragmatic adjustment
to a changing society, or a welcome embrace of other forms of leftist politics
(or as something else entirely), has made work a less vital political issue.
Voters are addressed as consumers, taxpayers, family members and even,
occasionally, citizens, but very rarely workers. As I have suggested above, this
has major implications outside the workplace, not least in the rapid growth in
inequality since the early 1980s (Dorling 2010); it also has implications for
the development of a notion of what constitutes good work, and for the por-
trayal of workers and the working class in our media and wider cultural life.
In the case of the cultural industries, many of those engaged in local
developments had struggled with the issue of representation for years. Ensur-
ing a more diverse workforce was their mission. However, by failing to engage
with the reality of cultural work, indeed by subscribing to the view of such
work as unproblematic and desirable, they failed utterly to engage with the
real nature of exclusion, which was often economic. Those who could not
aﬀord to work for low pay, or no pay, for long periods of time were often
from working-class backgrounds, and on this crucial issue their intermediary
representatives had very little to say.
Conclusions
The argument of this chapter is that the exclusion of work from cultural
industries policy is part of a wider story of the exclusion of work and there-
fore the politics of work, from mainstream politics, the media and wider
public discourse. In the UK, this can be seen explicitly in the policies pursued
under New Labour, both at the level of central government and, perhaps
more puzzling, by local authorities and voluntary groups, many of which were
less than fully signed up to many aspects of the New Labour project. It is not
a uniquely British story, however, but one that can be seen in many territories
where the idea of the cultural industries as a source of economic growth has
been embraced (Ross 2009).
The sources of this exclusion are complex and contested and no one nar-
rative can claim to capture it all. As Banks and Hesmondhalgh have argued
(2009: 416), policy documents of the time portray this work as not only
desirable but also ‘progressive’. It was a view, I would argue, that was shared
by many of those intermediaries involved in what they would see as commu-
nity-level economic development, including community arts organizations,
artists’ networks and informal learning organizations.
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It cannot be overstated how little success there has been in terms of tack-
ling under-representation in terms of gender, ethnicity or social class in the
cultural industries, and most of the data show the problem to be getting worse
rather than improving (Skillset 2009, 2010). Yet such concerns still matter.
The point is that they cannot be treated in isolation from debates about
quality of work, about ownership and control in the workplace and, in the
case of the cultural industries, about questions of representation and por-
trayal.
Angela McRobbie has recently called for a renewal of ‘radical social
enterprise and co-operatives’ in the cultural sector (McRobbie 2011: 33), and
beyond the cultural industries we do seem to be witnessing a rebirth of inter-
est in all things mutual and cooperative, even if such organizational forms
remain very much in the minority. Other have argued that the current UK
and other governments’ interest in happiness or well-being could make
workplace politics more central to policy concerns, given the evidence that
work is the source of so much unhappiness or ill-being (Davies 2011). The
current politics of protest, whether in the forms of the various ‘Occupy’ city
movements, or in case of tax justice or student protest movements, clearly
oﬀer potential for alliances with the labour movement, which has already
been taken up in many cases. The possibilities for making common cause
between social movements and labour organizations has not seemed stronger
for some time, given the economic crisis and the fear for a ‘lost generation’ of
young, unemployed people.
However, such times can also, of course, be diﬃcult for those campaigning
for better working conditions. The cultural industries have often been held up
as an indicator of the way work is going, whether that is in optimistic
accounts of ‘work as fun’, or concerns that precarity is becoming the norm
across the economy. Talking to those trying to enter the cultural sectors,
particularly students in higher education, often seems to reveal a mood of
resignation, combined with a lack of historical awareness of the progressive
changes that were brought about workers’ acting together. Social and ethical
concerns are often seen by such people as a major driver of their desire to
engage in cultural work; the need for these to be linked explicitly to a politics
of the workplace has never been greater.
Notes
1 For example the Precarious Workers Brigade, Carrotworkers Collective, Euro-
MayDay.
2 The term ‘New Labour’ generally refers to the British Labour government of 1997–
2010. The notion of the New Labour ‘project’ is generally dated from Tony Blair’s
accession to the leadership in 1994 and refers to a process of moving the Labour
Party in a rightwards, less social democratic direction.
3 The Employment Relations Act 1999 introduced statutory procedures for trade
union recognition in ﬁrms with more than 20 employees, gave employees the right
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to be accompanied by a trade union representative during disciplinary procedures
and mildly amended the law on strike ballots.
4 The GLC was London’s local government which, from 1981 to 1986, pioneered
cultural industry policies the emphasis of which was ﬁrmly on culture as a source
of production, and indeed of jobs for Londoners, particularly those from working-
class backgrounds and ethnic minorities.
5 The New Labour period saw the establishment of a number of public-funded net-
works in the UK, the aim of which was to support small creative industries by a
programme of events, information provision and advice.
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